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China-India Bilateral Trade:
Strong Fundamentals, Bright Future
Swaran Singh
1 China and India today represent Asia’s two largest and most dynamic societies which
are  emerging  as  new trend setters  in  international  relations.  Especially,  with  their
annual GDP growth rates standing respectively at 9.1% and 8.5% for 2003 and at 9.5%
and 6.9% for 2004, China and India have since come to be recognised as the fastest
growing economies. According to World Bank estimates, and assessed on the basis of
purchasing power parity, China and India have already become respectively the second
and fourth largest economies of the world surpassing developed countries1.
2 From the global perspective, China and India today represent two unique new players—
presenting an extraordinary combination of a very large GDP and still with significant
poverty and pockets of unrest and a very low per capita income and living standards.
This unique combination raises several questions about their becoming major drivers
in  international  economic  trends.  However,  in  the  politico-strategic  sphere,  their
recent economic success has resulted in both seeking an expanded space in regional as
well  as  international  decision-making,  something  that  is  becoming  a  matter  for
worldwide concern.
3 Thanks, however, to their colonial and cold war legacies, their economic success had,
for a long time, remained a mutually exclusive exercise thus slowing down its pace of
progress and its global impact. It is only rather recently that their political initiatives at
confidence-building began to expand their areas of mutual co-operation, which now
remains premised on their new mantra of mutual accommodation and mutual benefit2.
Their bilateral trade has since come to be recognised as the most reliable as also the
most agreeable instrument of China-India rapprochement. Their long-term potential as
trade  partners,  however,  remains  yet  to  be  fully  explored  and  exploited  and  their
political equations remain yet vulnerable to their problematic legacies3.
4 It is in this context of their fast changing equations that this article makes an attempt
to  hypothesise  how  their  bilateral  trade  promises  to  become  the  most  potent
instrument for resolving their political difficulties and facilitate progress in actualising
their  strategic  partnership  for  the  future.  This  China-India economic  partnership
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remains an essential prerequisite for the success of their regional and global political
initiatives.
The new context
5 The context of China-India bilateral trade itself—bilateral as well as regional and global
—has been changing rapidly. At the bilateral level, this is self-evident in the way their
rapidly growing trade partnership has provided a great boost to their ongoing political
confidence-building. In the wake of their diplomatic stand-off following India’s nuclear
tests of May 1998, their bilateral trade was the first to bounce back to its normal pace4.
However, this boom in their bilateral trade could not have been possible in absence of
bold political initiatives yet, in recent years, it is the role of their business communities
that  has  become  far  more  influential  in  determining  the  tone  and  tenor  of  their
political interactions.
6 Their  recent  signing  of  the  April  2005  “general  parameters”  agreement  for their
boundary settlement, their opening of a third border trade route through Sikkim in
June 2003, and now their discussions for evolving a China-India Free Trade Area (FTA)
remain some of the examples which have been accompanied by a reduction in forces
deployment on their border and revival of several cottage industries among border
communities in remote and inaccessible regions5. Apparently, policy-makers from both
sides have begun to increasingly focus on the social  and political  spin-offs  of  their
bilateral trade. The last five years have witnessed China-India trade quadruple and the
expectation that it will reach US$30 billion by 2010 appears increasingly credible6.
7 However,  for both China and India,  their rise to stardom is no without its share of
pitfalls,  puzzles  and  challenges.  Much  of  the  aforementioned  success  remains
particularly true of China with India slightly behind. India’s Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh is seen as an architect of India’s economic reforms and opening up7. However,
even  without  government  initiatives,  several  sectors  in  India  have  picked  up
momentum and will continue to grow helping New Delhi to catch up with Peking. For
example,  the  number  of  skilled  professionals  from  India  are  growing  at  enormous
speed. They mainly work in the software industry, and Chinese enthusiasm for India’s
information technology sector clearly recognises this new trend8.
Trends in bilateral trade ties
8 Nothing compares to the China-India bilateral trade when it comes to evaluating the
positive trends in post-1962 China-India relations. Starting with an extremely slow pace
with an annual turnover of only a few million dollars, and then staying on the margins
for much of the 1980s, their trade has gradually come to occupy the centre stage of
their interaction. The target of reaching US$20 billion in bilateral trade by 2008—set by
the two prime ministers in their meeting in Delhi in April 2005—is now expected to be
reached before end of 2005. Similarly, the target of US$30 billon of bilateral trade set
for 2010 is now expected to be reached by 20089. At least in the short-run, their current
institutional arrangements and enthusiasm augurs very well for their continued trade
boom, which can contribute a great deal to their growing confidence one in the other
and their evolving long-term strategic partnership10.
9 Especially, China’s foreign trade stood at US$851 billion for 2003 and exceeded US$1
trillion  for  2004.  India’s  foreign  trade,  by  comparison,  reached  only  about  US$180
billion for 2004. If the East Asian financial crisis had diverted China’s trade to India
then the countertrends in the wake of India’s nuclear tests of May 1998, resulted in
India’s total foreign trade sliding from US$86.86 for 1998 to US$81.84 billion for 1999.
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However, this general slide was not proportionally reflected in the China-India bilateral
trade though China this was perhaps one area most directly affected by India’s nuclear
tests (see Figure 1).
10 Positive trends in the bilateral trade have been particularly shaped by the economic
reforms on both sides and the consequent search for new business partners. As a result
of this, their complicated politico-strategic equations, that had continued to slow the
rising  enthusiasm,  have  come  to  be  underplayed  and  marginalised.  To  cite  some
examples of China using trade as its diplomatic tool, its trade with other problematic
neighbours like Japan and South Korea has increased respectively from US$16.8 billon
and US$0.7 billion for 1990 to a whopping US$99.6 billion and US$36.2 billion for 2002,
making them each other’s most valued trade partners. China’s combined trade with
Japan and South Korea reached US$212 billion for 200411. For the same period, China’s
bilateral trade with India grew from US$0.2 billion for 1990 to US$5 billion for 2002,
though it has increased much faster since then reaching US$7.6 billion for 2003 and
US$13.6 billion for 2004.
 
1. China-India Bilateral Trade
11 Viewed  in  the  context  of  South  Asia,  China’s  trade  with  India  have  witnessed
impressive  increases  defying  all  suspicions  about  China’s  special  relationship  with
Pakistan or China’s encirclement of India (see Figure 2). To highlight some other strong
fundamentals that promise to sustain their current trade boom, while China continues
to enjoy a huge favourable balance of trade vis-à-vis most other smaller states of the
South Asian region, it is only the China-India trade that has remained to be China’s
most balanced trade in South Asia and often the balance has been in favour of India.
This clearly reflects strong mutual stakes which promise to sustain this trade boom at
least in the short term (see Figure 3). Indeed, the two seem to be becoming increasingly
relaxed  about  their  bilateral  ties  and  are  now thinking  of  building  joint  strategies
towards their regional and global initiatives. No-one today talks of a China-India clash
in South-East Asia where both have built flourishing engagement without any mutual
friction  or  scepticism.  While  so  far  they  have  not  allowed this  to  become a  major
stumbling block yet their intensifying search for energy sources abroad is lately seen as
one area that could post a serious challenge for their economic engagement12.
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2. China’s Trade with South Asia
Strong fundamentals of China-India trade
12 It is the nature of China-India bilateral trade as a confidence-building measure that
must  be  underlined  to  appreciate  its  interface  with  their  political  relations  which
remains so critical for its long-term prospects. Therefore, more than being measured in
terms of statistics and profits,  it  is  the political  impact of  trade which remains the
barometer  of  their  economic  engagement.  Both  sides  clearly  display  that
understanding at least in their more recent initiatives. Moreover, with the inclusion of
India’s trade with Hong Kong and Macao (as also India’s rising trade with Taiwan, and
the  possibility  of  an  eventual  unification  of  Taiwan),  Greater  China  has  already
emerged as India’s largest trading partner and one of its kind.
13 Major items of export from India to China remain iron and chrome ore, plastic and
linoleum, marine products, cotton yarn and fabrics, organic and inorganic chemicals,
dye  intermediates,  bulk  drugs  and pharmaceuticals,  construction quality  wire  rods,
tobacco and tea, while China’s exports to India include items like raw silk and silk yarn,
coking coal, some types of chemicals, pulses, mercury and antimony, freshwater pearls,
pig iron, newsprint and several low-technology consumer items. Gradually, many new
sectors—like  border  trade  or  high-tech  trade—are  being  also  explored  while
information technology and infrastructure development are already emerging as major
areas for co-operation.
14 Thirdly, it  is the dynamism of their economies and societies,  especially their young
populations and increasingly skilled manpower, that are going to be their critical asset.
In absolute terms, as proportion of their total trade or even in terms of per capita trade
this may present a dismal picture, yet trends in the growth rate of China-India trade
show strong  potential  and  have  important  political  implications.  However,  even  in
terms of its share in their total foreign trade, while India accounts for little more than
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1% in  China’s  total  foreign  trade,  China  now accounts  for  over  5% of  India’s  total
foreign trade which creates substantial stakes for mutual co-operation13.
15 Finally, their foreign exchange reserves provide perhaps the easiest layman’s indicator
of  their  international  economic  standing.  China’s  foreign exchange  reserves,  which
stood at mere US$1.6 billion for 1978, had exceeded US$659 billion by March 200514.
These may not be huge figures compared to those of Japan at US$843 billion yet they
are when compared to India’s US$142 billion15.  The same also remains true of their
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows where China and India are often projected as
either  poles  apart  or  competing  against  each  other.  However,  both  have  again
continued  to  sustain  growth  simultaneously  without  any  major  friction.  Their  FDI
remains perhaps the strongest mover of their foreign trade and especially in case of
China it has come to be known as the main locomotive for their economic success. 
Foreign direct investment
16 Unlike India, FDI makes China a global player. In 2000, in cumulative terms, China was
world’s  fifth-largest  recipient  of  FDI,  after  the  United  States  (US$1.3  trillion),  the
United Kingdom (US$497 billion), Benelux Economic Union states (US$482 billion) and
Germany (US$480  billion).  But  for  2004,  China  was  to  clock  the  second largest  FDI
inflow of US$62 billion―next only to the United States which makes these FDI inflows
the most  critical  as  also most  visible  indicator of  its  sustained and rapid economic
development16. Even India is expected to emerge as the next hot spot for FDI inflows.
Amongst  others,  the  UNCTAD-DITE  Global  Investments  Prospects  Assessment  2004,
estimates for 2004-2007 put China and India at the top two ranks followed by the US as
third17. This, however, remains rather ambitious, especially for India. Even for China,
while it is expected to continue to leapfrog, it is likely to stay at its second position and
may not surpass the US for a very long time.
17 But  there  are  indicators  that  FDI  inflows  to  China  (even  India)  will  continue
unhindered. For  example,  China  today  accounts  for  over  10%  of  US  foreign  trade
destinations  and  China  owns  $167  billion  of  US  securities  issued  by  the  Federal
Government18.  During the year 2000, the total US corporate revenue generated from
China  was  $7.2  billion,  compared  to  $4.6  billion  from  Mexico,  $3.5  billion  from
Singapore, and $1.85 billion from Brazil19. Though China faced some phases when FDI
had gone down yet it has gradually witnessed rise from $2.7 billion for 1984 to $62
billion by 2004, largely staying within the range of $45 to $ 60 billion on an average
year20.
18 By comparison, India’s FDI has been generally sluggish and, for the early 1990s India’s
contracted FDI stood at $0.15 billion for 1991, $0.23 billion for 1992, $0.57 billion for
1993, $0.95 billion for 1994, and $1.96 billion for 199521. But from there, India’s FDI has
experiences some acceleration and rose to $3.4 billon for 2002 and $4.3 billion for 2003;
and  some  experts  also  question  calculation  methods  and  suspect  underplaying  of
India’s  FDI  statistics22.  For  year  2004,  India’s  FDI  was  estimated  to  exceed a  rather
impressive US$8 billion23.  And, given this new enthusiasm of the United Progressive
Alliance, the government has been talking of absorbing an FDI of US$15 billion for 2005
and US$30 billion for 2007 to reach a total of US$150 billion of fresh FDI in next ten
years24.
19 Among the reasons cited to explain India lagging behind, is the argument that China
had decided to open up to FDI back in 1979 and created special economic zones (SEZs)
in coastal regions that had the clear advantage of geographical proximity to Hong Kong
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—the hub of capital investment in Asia—, and that China had the added advantage of its
political  system, cheap labour and special  incentives for foreign investors as for its
armed forces which were to become major players in China’s opening up experiments25.
Also important is overseas Chinese contributions. Non-resident Indians and overseas
Chinese have been distinct categories in FDI inflows into their respective homelands.
Beginning only from the early 1990s, while non-resident Indians do contribute a little
to India’s FDI, overseas Chinese are known to present a unique example by contributing
over two-thirds of the whopping inflows of FDI into China26.
Institutional arrangements
20 As regards an evolving overall  institutional framework for their bilateral  trade,  the
China-India Joint Working Group for the Boundary Question (JWG) remains the most
generic  and  potent  forum  for  all  issues  and  sets  the  overall  tenor  of  China-India
relations. More specifically, the two also have a JWG for Trade and Commerce which is
supported by a Joint Business Council that represents business interests, in particular
of the non-state sector. They also have a JWG for Science and Technology that focuses
more on research and development sectors. In operative terms, much of the norms and
regulations for clearing road-blocks and evolving the new legal framework for trade
are facilitated by their regular meetings. Besides, using such opportunities as Summits,
many  more  agreements  have  been  signed  between  individual  Departments  and
Ministries from both sides27.
21 Among some more exciting institutional frameworks, China and India have recently
launched  discussions  to  evolve  a  bilateral  free  trade  area  (FTA)  agreement.  This
indicates  their  desire  to  go  beyond  the  World  Trade  Organisation  framework  and
mutually reduce tariffs even further as also to remove non-tariff barriers28. Indeed, in
their meeting over March 21st-22nd 2004, the senior officials from China and India had
launched  the  first  round  of  discussions  for  signing  a  FTA  agreement  and  a
comprehensive  economic  co-operation  agreement  in  Peking.  The  idea  was  further
followed  up  during  Premier  Wen  Jiabao’s  visit  to  India  over  April  9th-12th  2005.
However,  unlike  their  government,  some  Chinese  experts  continue  to  have  strong
misgivings. To quote one well-known expert on South Asia, “Although a FTA between
China and India will be hard to achieve in the short term, its significance in forming a
multi-party regional free trade system is apparent, given the huge population and size
of the two countries”29. Another Chinese expert believes that the stronger trade ties
and complimentary economic structures cannot ensure the quick establishment of a
FTA  between  the  two  countries”30.  India  has  its  own  reservations  and,  that  cheap
Chinese goods are flooding Indian markets has been a source of concern among India’s
business community as well31.
Investments and joint ventures
22 In  international  relations,  finance  capital  transfers  have  been  a  rather  recent
phenomenon compared to the trading of goods and services. But mutual investments
always reflect greater mutual confidence and provide a great boost to bilateral trade,
especially in the long-run. And this is  especially true when it comes to China-India
bilateral trade. However, as of now, the United States stands out as the largest investor,
accounting for about 21% of  India’s  total  FDI inflows.  Mauritius follows with a 12%
share,  but  it  is  really  a  conduit  for  investors  from various countries,  including the
United States, because of a special tax treaty with India which grants exemption from
Indian taxes  for  Mauritius-based companies.  The United Kingdom is  then the third
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largest investor in India followed by the Republic of Korea, Japan and the non-resident
Indians who now account for about 4% of India’s total FDI inflows32.
23 China’s export expansion in certain sectors has had a direct impact on similar exports
from and investment into labour-abundant India33. Yet, there are sectors where China
and India have entered into joint ventures and they today hold joint stakes in Kazakh
oil  firms  and Sudan’s  oilfields.  The  first  China-India  joint  venture—between India’s
Mideast Integrated Steel Limited and China Metallurgical Import Export Corporation—
was commissioned in Orissa way back in January 199334. 
24 As regards India’s investments in China, irrespective of its thriving private sector being
active since its  independence in 1947,  the nearest  that  India’s  investments were to
reach China were Hong Kong. China virtually allowed no foreign investment until the
early 1980s. But, even after long years of operations in Hong Kong, few businessman of
Indian origin made it really big in Hong Kong’s business circles. Also, considering that
much of Indian investments remain in services, Hong Kong continued to be the most
favoured destination as its obvious attraction as a hub of business and trading. Indeed,
it was from here that most Indian business houses made their debut in extending their
operations into China mainland.
25 This, however, is not true of Chinese investment that has been concentrated in India’s
mining  and  low-technology  manufacturing  sectors.  However,  given  their  political
baggage  of  their  problematic  past,  Chinese  investment  into  India  has  not  only
continued to heavily fluctuate but also continue to suffer from a huge gap between
their contracted FDI and their actual absorption in real projects on the ground. For the
period between August 1991 and August 2000, while China had contracted an FDI worth
US$225.07 million with India, the actual inflow was only US$0.56 million. Comparing
this  with  their  overall  performance  in  attracting  FDI,  both India  and  China  have
separately faired much better, which shows that the pace of their mutual investments
still continues to be guided by their bilateral politico-strategic equations.
26 The reality,  however, has been changing rapidly in last few years.  India’s Ranabaxy
pharmaceuticals  and  National  Institute  for  Information  Technology  (NIIT),  today
clearly  dominates  China’s  pharmaceuticals  and  IT  education.  There  have  also  been
several other smaller and less known initiatives in IT education. India’s Tata Group, one
of largest conglomerates in Asia, plans to increase its investment from US$2 million to
US$5 million in China’s software sector and has also been in discussion about joint-
venture projects in other sectors like automobiles and steel35. China’s home electrical
appliance  makers  Guangdong  province-based  Konka  and  India’s  Tata  Consultancy
Limited  (TCL)  have  also  established  joint  ventures  in  India.  China’s  Konka  though
halted its manufacturing in India due to the allegedly restrictive policies and it was
reported to have deep difference with its Indian partners36. But again, during the June
2003 visit by Prime Minister Vajpayee, China had pledged to invest US$500 million in
India’s infrastructure sector37.
Impact of nuclear tests
27 Without doubt, India’s nuclear tests of 1998 had presented the most serious acid-test
for China-India trade relations. There are various ways to examine how China-India
trade and commerce were affected by these tests, and how bilateral trade proved to be
a major catalyst in facilitating the post-1998 official and political interactions. Prime
facie, their bilateral trade had suffered a visible setback the growth rate tumbling from
an average 78% during the preceding eight years to mere a 3.4% for 1998. More curious
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was the follow-up: China-India trade was to undergo an exponential boom these last
seven years following the 1998 nuclear test (as shown in Figure 1). Indeed, a month-to-
month change in China-India trade for 1998 presents a most startling picture of the
business sector as the first to bounce back in a matter of six months, between May and
November 1998. 
28 Trends in trade surplus can be another important indicator of the impact of nuclear
tests on bilateral trade ties. Beginning from the early 1990s, while India had enjoyed a
trade surplus during 1992, 1993 and 1996, the trade surplus was with China during 1994,
1995,  1997.  In  fact,  according  to  experts,  the  China-India  trade  was  known  to
experience  fluctuations  even  within  each  year  as  India  generally  enjoyed  a  trade
surplus during the first half of the year while in China this trend was reversed during
the last few months, every time. For 1997, for example, during the first eight months of
1997, there was a trade surplus in favour of India of US$40 million. Very suddenly,
China’s exports experienced faster growth resulting in China having a trade surplus of
US$53 million by November which dropped to US$36 million by the end of December38.
But no such trend was seen during 1998 when the trade surplus with China reached its
peak of US$110 million though this rectified itself in 1999.
29 All that we had were the symbolic cancellation of China Commodity Fair in Mumbai
during August-September 1998 and China’s  visibly low-profile  presence during New
Delhi’s India International Trade Fair during November 1998. This did create scepticism
among businessmen on both sides.  Academic exchanges were the second important
sector to return to normal, not letting political polemics overshadow positive economic
initiatives.  In addition,  when seen in the larger context of  China’s  negative growth
rates  in  their  annual  trade  with  Asia,  even the  low positive  growth in  Sino-Indian
bilateral trade for 1998 trade inks was seen to bode very well for Sino-Indian ties39. 
Economic versus strategic priorities
30 How  much China-India  bilateral  trade  has  been  unaffected  by  politics?  Have  these
evolved any separation from their politico-strategic scepticism or do the two remain
fatally intertwined? China-India interaction following India’s nuclear tests in May 1998
again provides an ideal  case for  such analysis.  Very briefly,  it  was only during the
period of strong political polemics of the initial period of India’s nuclear tests that saw
some economic interaction being cancelled or postponed and Indian exports suffering a
visible setback during the first three or four months.
31 Indeed, the growth rate of China-India trade had already started slowing down from an
average of 78% for the first eight years of the 1990s, by about 30% per year during the
mid-1990s. It had further slid to 5.2% for 1997. Seen against the backdrop of the East
Asian financial crisis of late 1990s, China’s exports had also witnessed a general decline.
China’s exports to its major trade partners like Japan and South Korea as also its closest
ally Pakistan, sent a very positive message to India’s policy-makers. Even during those
difficult months of the summer of 1998, India signed agreements for five joint ventures
(two in China and three in Hong Kong) during 1998 involving an investment of US$8
million and other six joint ventures (one in China and five in Hong Kong) during 1999
involving investment of US$1.9 million40.
32 China’s  overall  exports  which were expected to grow at  a  respectable  9% (from its
heady 20% growth during 1997) grew only by 0.5% for 1998 and imports actually fell by
–1.5%.  China’s  exports  to  even  its  more  stable  Asian  partners  had  plunged
sharply―South Korea by 31.3 %, Hong Kong by 11.5% and Japan by 6.7%. Against this
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scenario,  Chinese exports to India grew by a respectable 8.9%. In 1998—the year of
India’s nuclear tests—India’s share of China’s international trade actually increased to
0.59% from 0.56% for 199741. It has since risen to 0.9% of China’s overall foreign trade
for 2003 and to 1.1% for 2004. India’s nuclear tests and other political rhetoric have had
only a limited impact on China-India bilateral trade. Their trade relations have had a
much stronger  positive  impact  and facilitated their  political  turnaround which has
potential for strong fundamentals for their trade relations.
33 Although  India’s  software  is  becoming  famous  and  is  attracting  attention  in  most
debate on China-India trade, given the labour-intensive nature their economies, both
will  have to be exceptionally innovative to sustain the current boom in their trade
relations. No doubt, the two have so far handled their economic engagement deftly
enough  but  their  rise  to  capture  global  resources  and  markets  is  very  likely  to
increasingly complicate their equations. For instance, in view of their rapidly rising
demand for energy, recent months have seen China and India beginning to undercut
each other in seeking control and stakes in various oilfields and oil firms42. Strands of
possible  economic  competition  do  exist,  and  the  chances  of  their  bilateral  trade
emerging as a stimulant for an eventual political stand-off cannot be completely ruled
out. This means that this second phase of their bonhomie remains as yet pretty fragile.
34 To be sure, China today aspires to match India’s success as an exporter of software and
Taiwan’s as an exporter of hardware. If  India has the advantage of language, China
produces three times the number of engineers as India, and Chinese companies like
Legend are proving serious competition to other brands and occupy 26% of China’s
market. China’s nascent private sector has already emerged as the most promising and
potent  driving  force  in  China’s  economic  opening-up  exercise.  During  1989-1997,
China’s  private  enterprises  grew  in  number  from  90,581  to  960,726  firms,  which
amounts to an annual increase of 34.3%. The workforce has increased from 1.64 million
to 13.49 million, an annual increase of 30.1% and their capital has increased from 8.4
billion yuan to 514 billion yuan, an increase of 67.2%43. None of these can be ignored as
paper tigers and will provide both several new challenges and opportunities for China-
India trade relations.
35 The return of Hong Kong to China has strengthened the China link of India’s business
community, many of whom have lived and thrived in Hong Kong for over one hundred
years.  Juxtaposed with China’s emerging private enterprises,  these new trends have
provided new momentum for China-India trade relations. It is especially this economic
engagement between their non-state sectors that has now begun to provide steam to
the  China-India  political  rapprochement,  promising  to  gradually  emerge  as  an
important force in moulding the nature and magnitude of China-India trade relations.
Nevertheless, given the multifaceted challenges for their economic engagement, the
hope lies in the two being able to continuously innovative to strengthen and evolve
their bilateral trade on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual confidence.
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NOTES
1. “India: the world’s 4th largest economy: World Bank”, The Indian Express (New Delhi),
June 16th 2004, p. 7. Citing the World Bank’s annual report Word Development Indicators 
2004, it shows that the largest five states in terms of purchasing power parity stood at
US$10,414 billon followed by China at US$5,792 billion and then Japan at US$3,481,
India at US$2,778 billion and finally Germany at US$2,226 billion.
2. For details see Swaran Singh, China-India Economic Engagement: Building Mutual
Confidence, New Delhi, Centre de Sciences Humaines, March 2005, pp. 17-20.
3. China and India have had a long-standing boundary dispute which involves
territories of over 138,000 sq kms on which they had fought a short but violent war in
1962 which had been followed by their continued scepticism about each other. The
presence of HH Dalai Lama and 100,000 Tibetans in India and China’s special relations
with Pakistan has been two other issues of mutual concern. It was only from the early
1970s that the two sides began to revive their close relations but progress has been slow
with several hiccups.
4. China-India trade began to return to normal in July 1998. Culture and commerce has
linked these two ancient civilisations since the second century BC. For details see
Swaran Singh, China-South Asia: Issues, Equations, Policies, New Delhi, Lancers Books, 2003.
5. Swaran Singh, “China-India Border Trade: A Tool for Building Mutual Confidence”, in
Isabelle Saine-Mezard and James K. Chin (eds.), China and India: Political and Strategic
Perspectives, Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, 2005, pp. 67-68.
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RÉSUMÉS
Booming bilateral trade has come to be the strongest pillar of China-India rapprochement. This
has not only since overtaken the pace of political confidence-building but also has a substantial
impact on their mutual perceptions. Their border trade has especially brought about a noticeable
transformation in their remote and problematic border regions. This has contributed to overall
tranquillity  and  peace  in  the  area  and  has  as  well  facilitated  progress  in  their  border
negotiations. 
This boom in trade has also introduced new trends. The two states are no longer only recipients
on foreign direct investment but have entered into a new phase of being investors, both mutually
as in other regions.  In this  new context,  the increasing deficit  in the energy sector and the
competition to capture new markets present major challenges to sustaining this boom in their
bilateral trade.
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